Introduction
Emission trading programs (also referred to as transferable or tradable pol lution rights and cap-and-trade policies) are an innovative approach to controlling pollution that continues to gather support from policymakers and members of the regulated community. Conceptually, emissions trading programs are quite simple yet have very powerful implications. The typical design of a market-based system requires first that an environmental authority decide on an acceptable level of over all emissions. Permits consistent with that target, each of which confer the right to release a certain amount of pollution over some period of time, are then issued to polluting firms. Facilities may apply these permits to their own emissions, sell excess permits to other pollution sources, or purchase permits from other firms if their emissions exceed their permit holdings. If the coverage of the system is exten sive enough and there are no serious institutional barriers to trading, an active mar ket in emissions permits is established. By exploiting the power of a market to allo cate pollution control responsibilities and by freeing facilities to choose the cheap est way to reduce their emissions, well-designed trading programs promise to achieve environmental quality goals more cheaply than traditional command-and control regulations. 1 Despite the perceived advantages of market-based environmental policies over traditional command-and-control approaches, a number of authors have made it clear that the efficiency gains realized by emissions trading programs will depend on rates of compliance, which in turn will depend on the enforcement processes and activities pursued by those running the programs (Keeler, 1991; Malik, 1990 Malik, , 1992 van Egteren &: Weber, 1996) . Others have provided conceptual analyses of how enforcement strategies for emissions trading programs should be designed to achieve high rates of compliance in a cost-effective manner (Beavis&: Walker, 1983; Stranlund &: Dhanda, 1999; Stranlund &: Chavez, 2000) . Almost no effort has been devoted to describing the enforcement practices and compliance performance of actual emissions trading programs.
Over the years, regulatory agencies have built administrative and legal sys tems to enforce the conventional command-and-control type of environmental reg ulation. Enforcement in a command-and-control world works by detecting and sanctioning performance that fails to meet the established standards. If a polluter has emissions in excess of the legal standard, the only way to move toward compli ance is to reduce emissions toward the standard. But polluters in an emissions trad ing program have another option. If they have emissions in excess of their permit holdings, they can do two things to come into compliance: reduce emissions or pur chase more permits. In an emissions trading system, therefore, regulators face a somewhat more complex enforcement problem. They must now focus both on emis sions and on the behavior of firms in emission permit markets. This suggests that successful enforcement must now be undertaken in coordination with the permit markets.
In this article, we combine a conceptual model of compliance incentives in emissions trading programs with descriptions of the enforcement practices and com pliance performance of actual programs to develop practical guidelines for enforcing these programs. The article proceeds as follows: We first present a model of the com pliance incentives of firms in an emissions trading program. Then, we turn to an account of the enforcement strategics employed in the two most prominent market based systems: the Sulfur Dioxide Allowance Trading program (S0 2 ) and the Regional Clean Air Incentives Market (RECLAIM) program. These programs have been described and discussed extensively (e.g., by Schwarze&: Zapfel, 2000), but to our knowledge, no one has focused as clearly on their enforcement provisions. Armed with a conceptual understanding of the compliance incentives in emissions trading programs and knowledge of the how the S0 2 and RECLAIM programs are enforced, we evaluate the compliance performance of these two programs thus far. Taken altogether-theory, practice, and performance-we are able to develop sever al practical guidelines for enforcing emissions trading programs, which we lay out in our concluding section.
Compliance Incentives in a Transferable Emissions Permit System
To provide a context for an examination of the structure of the compliance incentives faced by firms in an emission trading system, we first briefly review the basic elements of the S0 2 and RECLAIM programs.
Basics of the 502 and RECLAIM Programs
The EPA's Sulfur Dioxide Allowance Trading Program, which is part of the U.S. Acid Rain Program implemented under Title IV of the 1990 Clean Air Act Amendments, was designed to reduce annual S0 2 emissions from fossil-fueled elec tric utility units by almost 10 million tons, nearly 50% of the 1980 emissions levels. 2 The S0 2 program was designed to run in two phases. Phase I operations began in 1995, affecting a total of 445 units. Phase II of the program, which began in the year 2000, extended the coverage of the program to include about 2100 units fired by coal, oil, and gas (U.S. Environmental Protection Agency, 2000). Units are allocated emissions allowances, each one of which authorizes its owner to emit one ton of S0 2 during a given year or any year thereafter. Overall emissions reductions are achieved by limiting the number of allowances in circulation. S0 2 allowances can be bought and sold or held for compliance purposes in future years. Sources cannot, however, borrow against future allocations for present compliance purposes.
The Regional Clean Air Incentives Market (RECLAIM) program con tributes to the South Coast Air Quality Management District' s (AQMD) efforts to achieve federal ambient standards for ozone and particulate matter in the Los Angeles airshed. RECLAIM was designed to reduce emissions of two pollutants, nitrogen oxides (NOx) and sulfur oxide (SOx), from stationary sources that released more than four tons of either pollutant in any year since 1990. By the end of the 1999 compliance year, RECLAIM covered 354 facilities (South Coast Air Quality Management District, 200Ia) . 3 The RECLAIM program started operations in October 1993. By the year 2003, the program is expected to achieve reductions of 71% and 60% for NOx and SOx from 1994 levels by affected sources.
RECLAIM facilities are allocated RECLAIM Trading Credits (RTCs) for each year. Overall reductions in NOx and SOx emissions are achieved by reducing allocations of credits over time. Each credit allows the release of one pound of NOx or SOx during a specified compliance year. Facilities may sell or buy credits as they see fit. 4 No banking is allowed in the RECLAIM program-facilities may not borrow credits from future allocations, and in contrast to the S0 2 program, they are not allowed to save credits for use or sale in future compliance years.
Although the RECLAIM program is an emissions trading program, it also includes emissions fees (South Coast Air Quality Management District, 2002, May 28). The applicable unit fees for both NOx and SOx emissions increase with a facil ity' s level of emissions. Economists usually think of emissions taxes as an alternative method of incentive-based pollution control. In contrast, the RECLAIM taxes are clearly intended to help finance the program. However, as we will discuss shortly, these taxes probably have an impact on facilities' compliance incentives.
Compliance Incentives in an Emissions Trading Program
The overall goal of this article is to combine a conceptual understanding of compliance incentives in emissions trading programs with the practice and perfor mance of enforcing the S0 2 and RECLAIM programs to propose practical guidelines for enforcing these programs. Stranlund and Chavez (2000) have recently proposed an economic model of compliance incentives in a competitive emissions trading pro gram, which yields several conceptual principles for enforcing emissions trading programs. This section is based on their analysis.
They note that an important feature of the S0 2 and RECLAIM programs is their reliance on self-reporting of emissions from the facilities themselves. 5 There are, then, two ways in which a firm could be noncompliant: (1) an emissions viola tion occurs when the firm fails to hold enough permits to cover its emissions, and (2) a reporting violation occurs when the firm transmits erroneous emissions data. To deter these violations, regulators have three basic instruments: (1) the monitor ing of performance to identify incidences of noncompliance, (2) penalties for emis sions violations, and (3) possible penalties for reporting violations.
Under these conditions, firms will choose how much pollution they will emit, how much they will report emitting, and how many permits they will hold. It is reasonable to assume that firms will make these decisions to minimize their expected costs, which consist of emissions control costs, receipts or expenditures from permit market transactions, and expected penalties from reporting and emis sions violations. (A formal statement of a firm's decision problem is presented in the Appendix). Because the existing literature on enforcing market-based environmen tal programs has not yet been extended to dynamic environments, assume that emis sions permits may not be banked for future use or sale. 6 Suppose further that per mits are traded in a reasonably competitive environment; that is, no facility can exer cise power in the permit market, and transactions costs associated with trading per mits are minimal. Furthermore, facilities do not bear emissions fees as in the RECLAIM program.
The enforcement strategy required to maintain complete compliance in this setting has two parts, both of which tie the enforcement variables to the prevailing permit price. Denote the market price of permits as p; the probability that a source will get audited, which is assumed to be sufficient to discover a violation if one exists, as 7r, a per unit fine levied for emissions violations as J, and a per unit fine for reporting violations as g. 7 Assume that the penalties are applied automatically when violations are discovered. If the authorities wish to have complete compliance, there are two conditions that must be satisfied: (I) p < 7r X Cf+ g) and (2) 
The first condition provides firms with the proper incentive to submit truthful reports of their emissions. To understand why, first note that the permit price is the marginal benefit of noncompliance-it is the unit cost that is avoided when a firm chooses not to hold enough permits to cover its emissions. Second, note that if a firm misrepresents its emissions it is because it is motivated to cover up an emissions violation rather than purchasing enough permits to be in compliance. Therefore, the marginal benefit of misrepresenting a violation is the foregone cost of being in compliance, which is the permit price p. If a firm' s emissions and reporting violations are discovered, it faces the per unit penalty J for its emissions violation and the per unit penalty g for its reporting violation. The expected marginal cost of falsifying an emissions report is therefore 7r X Cf+ g). Hence, a firm will provide a truthful report of its emissions if the marginal benefit of under-reporting its emis sions, p, is not greater than the expected marginal cost, 7r X Cf+ g).
Notice that the unit penalty for a reporting violation is not required to make sure that a facility has the proper incentive to submit accurate emissions reports. In fact, the 50 2 and RECLAIM regulations do not include explicit penalties for sub mitting false emissions reports.
Guaranteeing accurate emissions reporting is only useful insofar as it serves the primary goal of achieving complete emissions compliance so that every firm holds enough permits to cover its emissions. In fact, firms will not hold enough per mits to cover their emissions unless they have the correct incentive to submit truth ful emissions reports. To understand why this is so, suppose that p > 7r X Cf + g) so that a firm is not motivated to provide a truthful report of its emissions.
The permit price p represents a firm' s marginal benefit of not holding enough permits to cover its emissions, whereas f rep resents the firm' s expected marginal cost of holding too few permits. Since the mar ginal benefit of the emissions violation outweighs its expected marginal cost, the firm will choose to hold fewer permits than it needs to cover its emissions. This is one of the most important lessons conveyed by this model of compliance incen tives---facilities in a transferable permit system will not have the proper incentive to be compliant unless the enforcement strategy they face also removes the incentive to submit falsified emissions reports.
Although obtaining accurate emissions reports is necessary to induce com pliance, it is not sufficient: The enforcement strategy must also satisfy p :Sf. Given the proper incentive to provide a truthful emissions report, a firm that is in violation will report the extent of its violation and will then be assessed the per unit penalty f. Therefore, if the price of being compliant-the permit price-is less than or equal to the certain marginal penalty for emissions violations, each firm will choose com plete emissions compliance. If not, each firm will emit more pollution than the num ber of permits it holds allows. The enforcement strategy required to maintain complete compliance high lights the importance of the prevailing permit price in determining compliance behavior. In a reasonably competitive environment, the prevailing permit price com pletely summarizes each facility' s marginal benefit of noncompliance. Thus, a firm' s compliance incentives do not depend on anything specific about itself, including its initial allocation of permits, its scale of operations, details about its production and emissions-control technologies, or its costs of reducing emissions. 8 This suggests an important principle for enforcing a competitive emissions trading program. Since firm-specific details are not important components of their compliance incentives, there is no reason for an enforcement authority to target its enforcement effort because it suspects that some facilities may be more likely to be noncompliant than others. 9 This is important because sources in a market-based pollution control pro gram will often be very different in ways that one might expect would influence their compliance incentives.
In imperfectly competitive environments, however, prevailing prices may not convey all the necessary information about facilities' marginal benefits of non compliance. Chavez (2000) shows that when a firm can exercise power in a permit market, its compliance incentives also depend on the degree to which the firm can manipulate permit prices. He also shows that significant transaction costs may also cause firms' marginal benefits of noncompliance to deviate from prevailing permit prices.
It is likely that the emissions fees faced by RECLAIM facilities will have the same impact. Recall that these are per unit taxes that increase with a facility' s level of emissions. When faced with an emissions tax, a facility in an emissions trading system has two reasons to be noncompliant: to avoid the cost of holding enough per mits to cover its emissions, the marginal benefit of which is the market price of per mits, and to avoid paying the emissions tax, the marginal benefit of which is the tax rate. Thus, a facility' s marginal benefit of noncompliance is the prevailing permit price plus the emissions tax rate. This suggests two aspects of the RECLAIM taxes that are important to keep in mind. First, when evaluating the compliance incentives of RECLAIM facilities, we must realize that the emissions tax they pay is an addi tional incentive to be noncompliant. Second, the differentiated tax rates suggests dif ferentiated compliance incentives-since the larger sources of emissions pay higher fees, they have a greater incentive to be noncompliant.
Noncompetitive elements aside, the importance of current permit prices in determining compliance incentives also suggests an important principle for setting penalties in competitive emissions trading programs. Instead of choosing fixed unit penalties, it may be more effective to tie penalties to the prevailing permit price. Since an effective enforcement strategy for a competitive trading system calls for set ting p ::5 1r X (f + g), fixed unit penalties would require that monitoring (as cap tured by the audit probability 1r) must keep pace with fluctuations in the prevailing permit price. This may be a difficult task for enforcement authorities working with limited budgets. Alternatively, marginal penalties could be tied directly to the pre vailing permit price. Then, marginal penalties would vary with permit price fluctu ations and serve to stabilize the monitoring requirement. 10
Enforcing the S02 and RECLAIM Programs
Additional guidelines for enforcing emissions trading programs can be gleaned from analyzing the actual practice of enforcing these programs. At the sim plest level, enforcement of any law is characterized by two components-monitor ing to detect violations and assessing sanctions if a violation is found. In this section we describe these components of the S0 2 and RECLAIM programs.
Monitoring in the S02 and RECLAIM Programs
Since the goal of enforcing an emissions trading program is basically to rec oncile a facility' s permit holdings with its total emissions over some compliance period, monitoring to accomplish this goal involves keeping track of permit hold ings and monitoring each source's emissions. In their essentials, the monitoring strategies of the S0 2 and RECLAIM programs are quite similar. Both programs have systems in place to track permit holdings. Emissions monitoring in both programs relies heavily on data generated and reported by the facilities themselves. To moni tor emissions accurately and to minimize the opportunities facilities may have to fal sify reports of their emissions, both programs impose rather stringent technological and process requirements.
All facilities in the S0 2 program are required to install continuous emis sions monitoring systems (CEMS), or an equivalent device, to monitor their emis sions. These systems are capable of providing a nearly continuous and very accurate account of the volume of emissions leaving a facility. A unit's CEMS sends the emis sions data to the utility' s Data Acquisition and Handling System (DAHS), which col lects and records the necessary measurements and formats the information elec tronically into a quarterly report. These quarterly reports are submitted to the EPA electronically. 11 The process for generating reports and submitting them to the EPA is fully automated, thereby minimizing the opportunities for tampering with the emissions data.
Monitoring by EPA officials is focused primarily on the facilities' emissions reports, as well as their testing and maintenance reports. The EPA subjects every emissions report to a series of reviews to verify its accuracy and to determine com pliance. Audits appear to be done primarily of the source' s reports rather than to consist of site visits, although the EPA may conduct site audits to inspect CEMS devices and review on-site operations and CEMS quality assurance records (U.S. EPA, 2002f, August 9).
RECLAIM facilities are also required to install and maintain specific moni toring and reporting equipment, but these requirements differ among types of sources. Specifically, NOx sources are classified into four categories depending on emissions levels: major sources, large sources, process units, and equipment. SOx sources are classified into three categories: major sources, process units, and equip ment.12 CEMS are required for all NOx and SOx major sources. Facilities in other source-categories are required to install monitoring systems that are cheaper than CEMS and that are correspondingly less accurate. NOx large sources must install a device called a fuel flow meter. Process units and equipment categories f or both NOx and SOx sources are required to use fuel flow meters or timers f o r emissions moni toring purposes. These devices are intended to produce periodic usage reports (amount of fuel or time of utilization), which, combined with equipment emission standards, are used to produce emissions reports (South Coast Air Quality Management District, 1991) . 13 Estimated emissions must be reported to the AQMD with specified equip ment and software. Major sources must use a Remote Terminal Unit (RTU) to telecommunicate data to the AQMD Central Station. The RTU collects data, per forms calculations, generates the appropriate data files, and transmits the data to the Central Station. Data for large sources and process units may be transmitted via RTU; alternatively, sources may compile the data manually and transmit them to the Central Station via modem.
At the end of each compliance year, RECLAIM authorities initiate audits for the previous year. Evaluations of reported data focus on ensuring the accuracy of the data and to check f o r incidences of noncompliance. Every single emissions report is audited in every single year. Each of these reviews apparently includes site visits to inspect equipment, monitoring devices, and operation records (South Coast Air Quality Management District, 1998 District, , 2000 District, , 2001a ).
The most difficult task of enforcing an emissions trading program is obtain ing an accurate and continuous measure of the emissions of each facility. Considering how much effort has gone into designing and maintaining the moni toring and reporting requirement in the 50 2 and RECLAIM programs, it is clear that policymakers are well aware of this.
Beyond the problem of estimating emissions, these data must be transmit ted to enf o rcement authorities so that they can make a determination of compliance. Our conceptual understanding of compliance incentives in emissions trading programs and the reporting requirements of the S0 2 and RECLAIM programs is that both stress the importance of removing firms' incentives or opportunities to submit falsified emissions reports. The compliance model suggests that this can be accom plished by providing the correct incentives for truthful reporting, whereas the S0 2 and RECLAIM programs accomplish this with very stringent technology require ments. Either way, it is clear that enforcement of any emissions trading program will be effective only if enforcers are able to obtain truthful reports of emissions from reg ulated facilities.
Sanctions in the 50 2 and RECLAIM Programs
To provide a deterrent against noncompliance in a transferable permit sys tem, facilities whose emissions exceed their permit holdings for some compliance period must face sanctions for these violations. The use of financial sanctions to punish noncompliance in the S0 2 program is quite close to the way penalties are applied in the model of compliance incentives described in the previous section. The unit penalty in the 50 2 program is unique in the fact that it is to be applied auto matically. The penalty was set at $2,000 per ton of excess emissions in 1990 and is indexed to inflation. Consequently, in 1998 the penalty was $2,581 per ton of excess emissions. In addition to the monetary penalty, a noncompliant utility must offset the excess S0 2 emissions from its allowance allocation in the next year.14 The most significant difference between the enforcement strategies of the S0 2 and RECLAIM programs is the way sanctions for emissions violations are applied. Whenever an audit reveals a RECLAIM facility to have emissions in excess of its credit holdings, the facility is provided an opportunity to review the audit and to present additional data to further refine the audit results. If, after that review, the facility is judged to be noncompliant, the facility' s allocation for the subsequent compliance year is automatically reduced by the total amount of excess emissions. In addition, the RECLAIM authorities may seek to impose administrative financial penalties. Noncompliant facilities may face penalties of up to $500 for every 1,000-pound exceedance for every day the exceedance persists. If the annual average price of credits per ton of emissions reaches $8,000, then, perhaps recognizing the greater incentive for sources to be noncompliant when credit prices are high, RECLAIM authorities can apply the $500 penalty to every 500 pounds of excess emissions, effectively doubling the available penalty. Imposition of the penalty depends on the facts of a particular case, including the extent of excess emissions, apparent reason for the exceedance, and the vigor with which a source moves to correct its viola tion. 15 It is clear that any financial penalties in the RECLAIM program will be imposed on a case-by-case basis rather than applied automatically as in the S0 2 pro gram. Because of the resulting uncertainty that facilities must have about the conse quences they will face if they are noncompliant, it is difficult to judge the deterrence value of the RECLAIM sanctions. We do know, however, that these sanctions pro vide less of a deterrent against emissions violations than if they were fixed and applied automatically. This is true because facilities will not base their compliance decisions on the maximum penalty, but on their expectations of what penalty may actually be applied, which, of course, will be some lower value than the available penalty.
Compliance in the S02 and RECLAIM Programs
The enforcement strategies used in the S0 2 and RECLAIM programs have been quite successful to this point. The SO 2 program has apparently achieved a per fect compliance record. Compliance rates in the RECLAIM program have ranged between 85% and 95%.
Compliance in the S0 2 Program
The perfect compliance record of the S0 2 program is quite remarkable when compared to other environmental policies. Our conceptual understanding of the compliance incentives in emissions trading programs provides a partial expla nation of why S0 2 facilities have always chosen to be fully compliant. 16 One of the most important messages conveyed by our understanding of compliance incentives is that they depend critically on prevailing permit prices. The reason is simple: The permit price in a well-functioning permit system is a facility' s marginal cost of acquiring enough permits to cover its emissions. When permit prices are high, facilities have a greater incentive to be noncompliant, and when they are low, facilities are more likely to be compliant.
Although price data from before the beginning of Phase I of the S0 2 pro gram in 1995 suggests highly variable trading prices, by early in the first year of the program, S0 2 allowance prices had converged so that allowances were trading at roughly the same prices Qoskow, Schmalensee, & Bailey, 1998). Since then, current vintage allowance prices have ranged from a low of $68 per ton in 1996 to over $200 per ton in 1999.17 During 2000, allowance prices fluctuated quite closely around $150. 18 The marginal penalty for emissions violations in the S0 2 trading program has always been many times higher than prevailing allowance prices. This implies that the probability of detecting a violation necessary to achieve complete emissions compliance 1T, which is determined from p ::5 1T X (f + g), can be very low. For example, in 1998, prices for allowances ranged between $100 and $200 per allowance. In the same year, the monetary penalty for excess emissions was $2,581 per unit. In addition, any excess emissions would have been offset in 1999, sug gesting an additional per unit penalty for forfeited 1999 allowances equal to the pre sent value of these allowances. Even if we do not account for this offset penalty, with a probability of detecting a violation as low as 0.08, p < 1T X (f + g) would be sat isfied and sources would have the correct incentive to provide accurate emissions reports (even without a penalty for reporting violations). Given the effort expended on monitoring and the stringency of the reporting requirements in the S0 2 program, the actual probability of detecting reporting and emissions violations is probably much higher.
We have noted that as long as p < 1T X (f + g) is satisfied, emissions com pliance is a simple matter of comparing the prevailing allowance price p to the cer tain unit penalty for emissions violations f. In the 1998 compliance year, for example, p < f was easily satisfied because the unit value of the S0 2 sanctions was between 13 and 27 times higher than prevailing allowance prices.
Our understanding of compliance incentives in emissions trading programs confirms Becker' s (1968) seminal insight about the substitutability between moni toring for compliance and penalties for noncompliance. He pointed out that if mon itoring is costly but setting penalties is not, the enforcement costs of maintaining compliance can be minimized by setting marginal penalties at arbitrarily high levels so that monitoring probabilities can be made arbitrarily small. There are very sound theoretical and ethical reasons for why this strategy is not very practical, and per haps for these reasons, the strategy is not observed in actual practice. 19 However, rel ative to prices for S0 2 allowances, the marginal penalty for emissions violations in the S0 2 program is very high. Thus, there is at least some precedence for setting penalties for emissions violations that are many times greater than prevailing permit prices. Within practical limits, therefore, the tradeoff between monitoring and penalties can be exploited to reduce monitoring effort or to increase the deterrence value of a particular monitoring strategy.
Because S0 2 sources may trade allowances dated for the future, we also have some indication of future allowance prices and, hence, future compliance incentives. Consider, for example, the results from the "7-year advance" auctions held by the U.S. EPA. 20 The clearing prices for these auctions were about $168 a ton in 1999, $55 per ton in 2000, and $105 a ton in 2001. For the same years, the clear ing prices in the spot auctions were about $201, $126, and $174, respectively. This information suggests that allowance prices in the near future will remain well below the penalty for excess emissions. Therefore, it is likely that the perfect compliance record of the S0 2 program will persist for some time.
Compliance in the RECLAIM Program
The RECLAIM program has experienced noncompliant firms from its inception. In the early years, much of the noncompliance was attributed to misun derstandings of the required protocols (South Coast Air Quality Management District, 1998) . In recent years, there has been a substantial amount of classic non compliance, that is, firms failing to purchase sufficient credits to cover their emis sions. In the 1998 compliance year, 27 out 329 firms were noncompliant in NOx emissions, whereas 31 out of 361 were noncompliant in 1999. In both years, all firms were compliant in SOx emissions. 21 Simple mistakes early on are easily explained as stemming from lack of experience with the RECLAIM rules. Explaining the more willful violations is not as straightforward. However, using the incentive approach that we've taken, a plausi ble explanation may start from the fact that effective prices for RECLAIM credits are high and increasing. In addition, because of the emissions fees that RECLAIM facilities face, their marginal benefits of noncompliance in the first 5 years of the program were much higher than indicated by credit prices. Relative to RECLAIM credit prices from 1994 to 1998, the fees are not small. Furthermore, these fees vary with the amount of pollution released. For annual emissions between 4 and 25 tons per year, the fees are currently $171 and $203 per ton of NOx and SOx, respectively. When annual emissions are between 25 and 75, the fees are $272 and $328 per ton of NOx and SOx, respectivel y. Finally, for annual emissions greater than 75 tons, the fees are $409 and $492 per ton of NOx and SOx, respectively. In 1998, the market price for credits for a ton of SOx emissions was about $300. Because of the SOx emissions fee, however, a small source of SOx faced an effective price of SOx emissions of just over $500 per ton, while the effective price for a large source was nearly $800 per ton, about 2.67 times higher than the prevailing credit price at the time. Of course, with current credit prices many times higher than they were in 1998, the impact of the emissions fees on RECLAIM facilities' compliance incentives has eroded substan tially.
RECLAIM violations may also result from the fact that the monetary penal ties for emissions violations are not fixed or automatic. Recall that stated monetary penalties in the RECLAIM regulations are maximum administrative penalties and that actual sanctions are to be decided on a case-by-case basis. The uncertainty that RECLAIM facilities must then have about the consequences of their violations lessens the deterrence value of these sanctions; that is, facilities' evaluations of their expected marginal costs of noncompliance are probably substantially lower than if the sanctions were fixed and applied automatically. Because of the relatively low expected marginal costs of noncompliance that stem from the uncertainty of the financial sanctions they may face, and the high marginal benefits of noncompliance that are exacerbated by the RECLAIM emissions fees, it is quite possible that a num ber of RECLAIM facilities have decided that the incentives they face do not warrant their full compliance.
We are also somewhat pessimistic about the future performance of the RECLAIM program. Not only will credit prices be quite high for the 2000 compli ance year, they will remain high into the near future. The average price for 2003 NOx credits traded in 2000 was about $13,800, and the average price for 2003 SOx credits traded in 2000 was nearly $3,000 per ton (South Coast Air Quality Management District, 2001a). If there is no off-setting change in the RECLAIM enforcement strategy, the compliance problems the program has experienced thus far, though relatively few in number to this point in time, may very well increase in the future.
Conclusions: Principles for Enforcing Emissions Trading Programs
Taken together-a conceptual understanding of the compliance incentives faced by firms in an emissions trading program, the practice of enforcing the S0 2 and RECLAIM programs, and the compliance performance of S0 2 and RECLAIM facilities thus far-several guidelines for enforcing emissions trading programs emerge.
Our approach to examining compliance incentives in emissions trading programs stresses the importance of the prevailing permit price. In a competitive trading environment, the prevailing permit price completely summarizes each facil ity' s marginal benefit of noncompliance. A number of guiding principles follow from this observation. First, details about a firm' s operations, such as its production and emissions-control technologies, are not important components of their compliance incentives. Therefore, there is no reason for an enforcement authority to target its enforcement effort because it suspects that some facilities may be more likely to be noncompliant than others, even though they may be quite heterogeneous. There is no evidence that S0 2 and RECLAIM officials pursue some sort of targeted enforce ment strategy.
Unfortunately, in noncompetitive environments-those in which permit trades involve significant transaction costs, when a firm or group of firms can exer cise power in a permit market, or when firms face differentiated emissions taxes as in the RECLAIM program-prevailing permit prices may not convey all the neces sary information about facilities' compliance incentives. Furthermore, these compli cations may produce differentiated compliance incentives.
We have also made several suggestions for setting penalties in emissions trading programs. First, since permit prices have such an important influence on compliance incentives, to stabilize compliance incentives and corresponding enforcement strategies in the face of permit price fluctuations, unit penalties for emissions violations should be tied directly to prevailing permit prices. This sug gestion may be particularly useful in the RECLAIM program, in which credit prices have risen rapidly over the last couple of years. Unit penalties that follow credit prices would offset the increasing incentive toward noncompliance that comes with higher credit prices.
Second, these penalties should be substantially higher than prevailing per mit prices. Certainly, the perfect compliance record of facilities in the S0 2 program is due in large part to the fact that penalties in the S0 2 program have always been many times higher than going allowance prices.
Third, the application of penalties should not produce uncertainty for firms about the consequences of noncompliance. The fact that the unit penalty in the S0 2 program is fixed and applied automatically has probably been another contributing factor to the perfect compliance record of S0 2 facilities. On the other hand, we sus pect that the determination of penalties on a case-by-case basis in the RECLAIM pro gram produces uncertainty for facilities about the consequences of noncompliance and thus weakens the deterrence value of the RECLAIM enforcement strategy.
On the other side of the enforcement equation-monitoring for compli ance-it is clear that a well-functioning emissions trading program requires contin uous and reasonably accurate estimates of the emissions leaving each facility. The designers of the enforcement components of the S02 and RECLAIM programs addressed this difficulty by requiring emissions sources to install and maintain advanced emissions monitoring systems. Furthermore, our understanding of com pliance incentives in emissions trading programs makes it clear that enforcement of any emissions trading program will be effective only if the incentive or opportuni ties for falsifying emissions reports are removed. As with generating accurate emis sions data, the S02 and RECLAIM programs addressed this issue with very stringent technological and process requirements for submitting data to enforcement author ities.
Although it is true that our understanding of the theory and practice of enforcing emissions trading programs adds new insight into the problem, it is equal ly true that this exercise reveals critical areas in which our knowledge is lacking. Future research that addresses issues concerning the dynamics of compliance, mon itoring accuracy, and the enforcement problems associated with implementing emis sions trading programs in a wider variety of environmental policy problems than at present is needed to help refine existing enforcement strategies and to design enforcement strategies for new market-based policies.
The practice and theory of market-based environmental control has pro gressed quite far since they were first proposed more than 30 years ago. However, too little attention has been given to understanding the nature of the compliance incentives inherent in these programs and to the manner in which these programs are actually enforced. It is our hope that this work will help to bridge the gap between the practice and theory of enforcing market-based environmental policies and that it will help motivate policymakers and analysts alike to look for even more innovative ways to ensure that market-based policies can achieve environmental quality goals while conserving private and public resources. ***
